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This article aims at capturing how the recent changes in Hungary’s mixed-member 
electoral system altered the candidates’ personal vote-seeking strategies. Based on the 
literature, one might expect that strengthening the role of the Single-Member District 
(SMD) tier increases the incentives for personalisation. By utilizing the data from two 
consecutive waves of the Comparative Candidate Survey, we show that contrary to 
these expectations the average level of campaign personalisation decreased from 2010 
to 2014. Semi-structured interviews with nine campaign staff members confirm that the 
political constraints were more important in determining campaign strategies than the 
institutional setting. Our findings challenge the dominating effect of electoral rules on 
personal vote-seeking.
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Introduction
It has been extensively argued that a certain proportion of the candidates’ vote share 
is independent from party affiliation, fixed voter characteristics, and economic trends.1 
This fraction of the vote is called the personal vote and it originates in the qualifica-
tions, abilities, personal characteristics, and the record of the candidates.2 To appeal to 
the personal vote, candidates must advertise these features and increase visibility by 
organising personalised campaigns. Nevertheless, the utility of such campaigns is a 
function of the electoral rules under which Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected.
There is a difference between electoral systems in terms of how much incentive 
they create for seeking a personal vote.3 electoral formula,4 ballot structure,5 and 
district magnitude6 are all demonstrated to affect personal vote-seeking. Focusing on 
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the electoral formula, while Single-Member Districts (SMDs) create incentives to 
personalise through a clear linkage of accountability and the voters’ ability to choose 
between candidates, multi-member districts leave space for personalisation only if 
party lists are flexible. In a mixed-member system, a considerable percentage of the 
MPs are elected on the SMD tier. Thus, for a relatively high percentage of the candi-
dates, campaign personalisation is a viable strategy to attract extra votes. Intuitively, 
the more dominant the role of the SMD tier is in getting elected, the larger the incen-
tives to seek a personal vote.
This article focuses on the effect of electoral rules on campaign personalisation in 
the context of a country applying mixed electoral rules. Recent changes in the 
Hungarian electoral system provide us with an opportunity to test how strong the 
effect of the SMD tier actually is. We investigate whether—as the literature would 
suggest—the increasing significance of the SMD tier makes individual campaigns 
more personalised. Based on an analysis of two Hungarian rounds of the Comparative 
Candidates Survey from 2010 and 2014, and a series of semi-structured interviews, 
we conclude that political constraints render the effect of electoral system change 
limited.
The study of campaign personalisation is paramount for at least two reasons. First, 
in order to have a solid electoral connection between the representatives and rep-
resented, the representatives need to be seen. Personalised campaigning increases 
visibility and thus fosters the accountability of individual legislators. Second, as 
some have already suggested,7 personalised campaigns might serve as indicators of 
how candidates will behave in parliament when elected. Legislators with more 
personalised campaigns may be more inclined to constituency orientation and voting 
against the party if the party’s opinion conflicts with constituent interests. Therefore, 
personalised campaigns help voters in their quest to elect “good” representatives8 
and thus increase the quality of representation.
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we give a brief insight into the 
literature on the relationship between electoral rules and personalisation. It is 
followed by an introduction to the recent changes in the Hungarian electoral system, 
where we formulate expectations derived from the literature and make a counter-
argument based on political context. The third section introduces our data and variables 
with a short description of the anticipated variable effects. Fourth, multivariate 
models are built to capture the change in campaign personalisation between 2010 
and 2014, which is complemented by a series of interviews with campaign experts 
and analysts. Finally, we summarise the results in the last section.
Theoretical Framework
Recent research on the connection between electoral rules and campaign person-
alisation is vast.9 authors agree that candidate-centred electoral rules encourage 
campaign personalisation, while party-centeredness pushes the focus of the 
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campaign toward the party end of the continuum. In their oft-cited article, Carey and 
Shugart ranked the different electoral systems on the basis of the incentives they 
offer to cultivate the personal vote.10 Three major factors were taken into account to 
assess the effects of the various system variants: electoral formula, ballot structure, 
and district magnitude. From these three aspects we focus on the first, which dis-
tinguishes between majoritarian and Proportional Representation (PR) systems.
The differences between the two types of electoral system are related to their 
application of single-member versus multi-member constituencies. While SMDs 
create a stronger linkage of accountability by setting clear responsibility for the 
different (positive and negative) outcomes,11 multi-member districts increase the 
incentives to free-ride on the achievements of fellow MPs by reason of the territorial 
overlap between legislators.12 In such systems, legislators are more accountable to 
the party leadership than to the electorate,13 which essentially makes the contest for 
re-election a fight for higher positions on the party list.14
Furthermore, rules and practices of candidate selection affect personalisation sub-
stantially. as argued by several researchers, selection strategies are the major deter-
minants of whether the electoral system truly rewards or punishes personalisation.15 
as a general rule, the more decentralised the nomination process, the greater the 
incentives for the candidates to personalise.16 Centralised and exclusive candidate 
selection might even overwrite the effect of electoral rules on campaign personalisa-
tion. In countries where the party centre has exclusive control over nomination, and 
the proportion of safe seats is large, the competition for re-election becomes a struggle 
for re-selection. Thus, it might be logical to expect that selected candidates are more 
loyal to the party than those who were not chosen. Therefore, party-centred cam-
paigning will also be more pronounced even under candidate-centred electoral rules.
The concern over the effect of candidate selection masking the effect of the 
electoral system is also valid for Hungary, where parties—especially those having a 
realistic chance at winning mandates on the SMD tier17—centralise candidate selection. 
The question here is whether there is any place for personal vote-seeking in a party 
with centralised (and exclusive) candidate selection procedures. Oddly, the answer is 
yes. even when there is no place for the voters to choose between candidates from 
the same party, the party’s right to nominate a candidate might play a crucial role in 
increasing the incentives to personal vote cultivation.18 Cain et al. point to possible 
party strategies to attract votes that encourage the nomination of locally well-known 
candidates to the party lists.19 Curtice and Shively, and gallagher and Holliday also 
agree that if voters value candidates who actively engage in constituency service, 
district representation, and ombudsman-like activities, then parties have an incentive 
to give priority to personal vote-seeking instead of building only on party appeal.20 
Thus, personalisation may not only be a tool of individualisation for candidates but 
also a party strategy. although centralised candidate selection shifts candidates to 
pursue party-oriented campaigns, it does not necessarily enforce party-centeredness 
in the case of candidates with high visibility.21
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as we have seen, there is a consensus that majoritarian systems support person-
alised campaigns. The rules of PR on the other hand, especially with closed ballots, 
strengthen the party aspect of campaigning. The question is whether in systems that 
incorporate both SMDs and multi-member districts, candidate or party centeredness 
will prevail. It can be argued that if success in the SMD competition is key for 
winning the election, parties should mobilise resources and adopt strategies that 
increase the number of votes on the SMD tier. assuming that party popularity in the 
district is given, the way to increase the SMD vote share is to appeal to personal vote 
by strengthening candidate visibility through campaigning. Based on the literature, 
we test whether or not the increasing importance of the SMD tier makes individual 
campaigns more personalised.
The changes in the Hungarian electoral rules in 2011 offer a great opportunity to 
observe the effect of the majoritarian shift in a mixed-member electoral system. In 
the next section, we argue that recent changes in the electoral system strengthen the 
SMD tier, and thus should increase incentives to personalise. additionally, taking 
into account the political context, we make a counterargument that limits the effect 
of electoral rules on personalisation.
The Hungarian Case
Post-transition Hungary has a mixed-member majority system with partial 
compensation.22 electoral rules from 1990 to 2010 were largely the same, with a few 
modifications in 1994.23 The first considerable change was administered in 2011, 
and pushed the system closer to the majoritarian end of the majoritarian versus PR 
continuum. In that respect, Hungary is a peculiar case within the context of eastern 
europe. In the 1990s, the majority of eastern european countries adopted proportional 
representation as the electoral formula. although some have tried to replace PR with 
majoritarian electoral rules applying single-member districts, none have been 
completely successful. Romania, for example, switched from PR to mixed electoral 
rules, but the system has remained fairly proportional. The main reason for the 
general reluctance to introduce majoritarian rules is argued to be that consensus 
democracy itself is not compatible with majoritarian voting systems.24
From 1990 to 2010, 386 representatives were elected in three tiers. On the SMD 
tier, 176 mandates were distributed in a majority run-off system: absolute majority in 
the first round, and first-past-the-post (FPTP) in the second. In the second round, the 
first three candidates from the first round and everyone who reached the 15 per cent 
mark were invited to compete for the seat. On the regional list tier, a maximum of 
152 mandates were available from twenty regions (nineteen counties and the capital 
city). Seats were allocated by the PR principle applying the Hagenbach-Bischoff 
formula. Mandates not distributed on this level pooled to the national list tier, where 
at least fifty-eight legislators were elected. Party lists on the regional and national 
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tiers were closed. although there were three electoral tiers, voters could cast only 
two votes: one for an SMD candidate and one for a regional party list. The national 
level vote count equals the sum of votes cast for the losing candidates in the SMDs 
and the votes that were not essential to win mandates on the regional list tier. This 
pool of votes from the lower levels to the national tier balances the disproportionalities 
created by the SMD tier. Mandates on the national list tier are allocated using the 
d’Hondt method. Furthermore, only parties that reached 5 per cent of all the nation-
ally aggregated regional list votes were entitled to mandates from the list tiers (both 
regional and national). Parties not reaching the 5 per cent threshold may only keep 
their SMD seats.
In 2011, new electoral rules were adopted, and the logic of political competition 
was substantially changed. This was the first and (to date) the only change to the 
electoral system that influenced the transformation of votes into mandates. The new 
law radically decreased the number of legislators from 386 to 199. Redistricting 
resulted in 106 SMDs, in which MPs are elected by the rules of FPTP in one electoral 
round. The remaining 93 seats are distributed on the national level. The party list 
votes come from two sources. First, voters cast their votes for one of the competing 
party lists. Second, votes not necessary for election on the SMD level are pooled to 
the national tier. This also includes the votes of winning candidates, in which case the 
vote difference between the first two candidates in the SMD minus 1 adds to the 
national level vote count. as to the ballot structure, party lists remain closed. The 
level of the electoral threshold also stays the same. Table 1 summarises the changes 
in the electoral system.
Naturally, changes in the electoral rules alter the logic of political competition. 
They influence party system fragmentation, coalition strategies, the proportionality 
of parliamentary representation, the local orientation of legislators as well as 
campaign strategies just to name a few. In the following, we discuss changes that 
directly influence how parties and individual candidates might perceive the benefits 
Table 1
Major Changes in Electoral Rules in 2011
2010 elections 2014 elections
176 SMD mandates out of 386 seats in parliament 106 SMD mandates out of 199 seats in parliament
Three tiers (SMD, regional, national) Two tiers (SMD, national)
Non-utilized votes on the first tier: votes cast for 
the losing candidates (losers’ compensation)
Non-utilized votes on the first tier: votes not 
essential to get elected (winners’ compensation)
Two rounds One round
Voters do not vote for the national party lists Voters vote for the national party lists
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of personalisation, and argue that the changes encourage candidates to pursue more 
personalised campaigns.
First and foremost, while in 2010, 45.6 per cent of MPs were elected on the SMD 
tier, in 2014, this percentage increased to 53.2. Therefore, the SMD competition 
became even more important for both the parties and the candidates. Massive 
electoral success in the constituencies makes final victory very likely. Furthermore, 
for the individual candidates, a larger proportion of MPs elected in SMDs increases 
the relative value of the constituencies in getting (re-)elected. Thus, given the 
connection between SMDs and campaign personalisation, it can be expected that 
personalisation will also be more apparent.
Second, losing one of the list tiers further increases the importance of the SMD 
tier in the quest for election. Whereas in 2010 candidates had three shots at winning 
a mandate, in 2014 they only had two. In 2010 SMD candidates were usually placed 
high on the regional party lists, while top positions on the national list went to 
national-level party leaders. Thus, unsuccessful SMD candidates were elected from 
the regional lists with a greater probability than from the national tier. The 
implementation of the new electoral rules hardly changes the logic of how the 
national party lists are constructed: party leaders will still select themselves to the top 
positions. There is also no reason to think that the number of party leaders decreased 
between the two elections. This means that the structure of the national list will 
remain the same. Nevertheless, in 2010, regional party lists could absorb the majority 
of losing SMD candidates, who then did not burden the national party lists. In 2014, 
however, although the national list tier was longer than in 2010, it was only long 
enough to secure the seats for a limited number of SMD losers. Thus the “safety net” 
under the candidates is not that “safe” anymore after introducing new electoral rules 
resulting in a fiercer competition on the first tier. The growing importance of winning 
the SMD seat motivates candidates to gain extra votes by expanding the party 
campaign with traits of personalisation.
Third, losers’ compensation on the list tier in 2010 encouraged underdogs to 
gather extra votes through personalisation and then pool their votes to the national 
level, where they could boost the party vote count. In 2014, winners no longer had to 
give up extra votes either. Winners’ compensation ensures that votes not needed to 
get elected will also increase the party votes. In 2014, both prospective winners25 and 
losers were interested in pursuing personal vote, while in 2010 only losers were. 
Thus, campaign personalisation is expected to increase from 2010 to 2014.
The literature on the effects of electoral rules often neglects the context in which 
the effects of rules are shaped. To evaluate the effects of electoral system change, one 
should look at the political climate and power relations in which these changes take 
place. During the electoral system change, Hungary faced a political situation that 
was rather peculiar taken the whole post-transition period into account. By 2002, the 
logic of the electoral rules created a two-block system with two big and several small 
parties competing in two large party blocks. The left was led by MSZP26 that—together 
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with SZDSZ27—governed in 1994–1998, 2002–2006, and 2006–2010. Fidesz28 was 
MSZP’s counterpart on the right leading the government coalition in 1998–2002. 
The party system became more concentrated and the role of winning in the SMDs 
was said to become more and more important for winning elections. The competition 
of the two blocks was fairly balanced until 2010 when the two-block system was 
replaced with one-party hegemony.29 The popularity of MSZP started to decline after 
the infamous speech of Prime Minister Ferenc gyurcsány was leaked in September 
2006, in which he admitted that they had lied to the citizens and that they had not 
done anything significant during their previous term between 2002 and 2006.
While polls placed the two main parties neck and neck (35–35 per cent) just before 
the 2006 elections, by 2010 MSZP had fallen below 15 per cent, whereas Fidesz man-
aged to keep its popularity at 35 per cent. The difference between the two parties was 
even more significant within the group of “certain” voters: Fidesz scored 60 per cent 
while MSZP hardly reached 20 per cent.30 The victory of Fidesz seemed certain, and 
only one question remained: would Fidesz reach a two-thirds majority in parliament or 
not. Power relations between the 2014 elections were quite similar. Fidesz had about 50 
per cent of votes within the group of “certain” voters, whereas the left-wing coalition 
reached only 20–25 per cent.31 The victory of Fidesz-KDNP was again expected by all 
competing parties, which was further cemented by the new election law of 2011. Several 
have argued that the new electoral rules clearly benefit Fidesz, especially with the con-
figuration of the new constituency boundaries,32 and allowing nonresident citizens to 
vote.33 additionally, as Fidesz was expected to win the overwhelming majority of the 
SMD seats, “winner’s compensation” mainly served the interests of the governing party.
Based on the above, the changes in the electoral rules shifted the system in a more 
majoritarian direction, and at the same time became a tool to strengthen the government’s 
position. election results were highly predictable, with Fidesz harvesting the SMDs 
and the opposition losing its former strongholds. Under such circumstances, parties 
may want to refrain from the costly business of campaign personalisation. Fidesz 
dominates the districts, while parties with no hope in the constituencies may want to 
focus on strengthening their party image. With this in mind, even if the electoral rules 
favoured increased personalisation, political context might have stepped in to redi-
rect candidate-centred campaign to party-centeredness. To solve this puzzle, we 
build upon the data set of the Comparative Candidate Survey and expert interviews 
with campaign managers, strategists, and analysts.
Research Design
The analysis first utilises the data of the Comparative Candidates Survey 
collected in 2010 and 2014 shortly after the elections. The data constitute an 
unbalanced panel, with 73 candidates participating in both waves.34 MPs were 
randomly selected for face-to-face interviews. Unsuccessful candidates were 
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contacted with the online version of the questionnaire. as a result, the sample 
contains 205 (53.8 per cent of the 2010 sample) MPs in 2010, and 88 (38.4 per 
cent of the 2014 sample) in 2014.35 Nevertheless, we are not aware of any circum-
stance that would make non-response not random in the group of unsuccessful 
candidates. although only a part of the sample may be considered random, we 
apply the standard tests of significance to establish the effect of system change 
on campaign personalisation.36
We apply the concept of campaign norms by Zittel and gschwend.37 We asked 
respondents to place the main goal of their campaigns on an 11-point scale, with 
low values indicating party-centeredness, and large values indicating candidate-
centeredness. In other words, the larger the value of this variable, the more 
personalised the individual candidates’ campaigns. Figure 1 shows the Kernel density 
estimation38 of the campaign norms variable at the two elections. From 2010 to 2014, 
the graph shifted to the left (i.e., the party-centred end of the scale), which is not in 
line with the expectations of the literature.
We also looked at the connection of our dependent variable to the usage of various 
campaign tools to see if it indeed measures campaign personalisation. These 
campaign tools were (1) personal campaign posters, (2) personal newspaper ads, (3) 
personal spots in radio/TV/cinemas, (4) personal flyers or other (give-away) 
campaign materials, and (5) personal websites. analysis of variance (aNOVa) 
suggests that there are statistically significant connections between campaign norms 
Figure 1
The Kernel density of campaign personalisation in 2010 and 2014
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and the usage of the different personalised campaign tools.39 Therefore, we argue 
that campaign norms capture personalisation rather well.
However, in order to establish the effect of system change, a few factors have to be 
controlled for. Control variables include dummies for candidacy features (SMD candidate 
and Multiple candidacy), incumbency (SMD incumbent), local positions (Local political 
position40), party affiliation (Fidesz-KDNP,41 MSZP, Jobbik,42 LMP,43 and Összefogás44), 
perceived Ideological distance between the candidate and the nominating party, candidate 
selection as perceived by the candidates (Selection by party leadership), and Electoral 
security. Technical details and descriptive statistics are displayed in the appendix.
To measure the effect of system change, we include time into the model (Election). 
This variable will absorb all changes happening between the two elections. 
Nevertheless, we cannot be certain that the changes the time variable causes in per-
sonalisation can be attributed solely to the electoral system change. even if the effect 
of time points to the expected (positive) direction, additional information is needed to 
confirm that the change in personalisation can be attributed to the change in the elec-
toral rules. Thus, to interpret the effect of time, we conducted semi-structured inter-
views with nine campaign experts who took leading roles in organising the 2014 
campaigns of Fidesz, KDNP, MSZP, Jobbik, LMP, együtt 2014, DK, and PM. 
Interviews were carried out during January and February of 2015. Interviewees were 
chosen based on their expertise and leadership roles in campaigning: we selected pro-
fessionals who were able to provide us with relevant information on the different 
parties’ campaign strategies. The selection was not random. We contacted the chief 
campaign managers of all parties in question to request an interview. In the case they 
were not available, we asked them to refer us to the next person in the campaign hier-
archy, and so on. as a result, we interviewed 5 chief campaign managers, 1 spokesper-
son, 1 analyst specialised in party campaigns, 1 political adviser, and 1 MP who was 
a member of the central campaign team. all interview subjects participated in the 
2010 campaign as well, thus we could effectively compare the two elections.
Control Variables
as stated earlier, to show the net effect of time on campaign personalisation, we 
need to control for variables that presumably influence personalisation. On the basis 
of the literature on the connection between the electoral formula and personal vote-
seeking, we expect the campaigns of SMD candidates to be more personalised. 
Similarly, SMD incumbents are expected to campaign in a more personalised way. 
They enjoy greater visibility45 within their districts than challengers, and they have 
better access to the local media as well as resources to use campaign tools supporting 
personalisation. Furthermore, they possess crucial information on constituency-
related issues that allows them to customise campaign messages.
as to local political positions, it has been argued that voters favour candidates 
who are connected to the constituency.46 Therefore, local politicians are clearly an 
asset for the party during the elections, because of their potential to gather personal 
10 east european Politics and Societies and Cultures
vote. However, to achieve this, they have to lead more personalised campaigns, and 
also sometimes deviate from the party line.47 Local offices are not the only positions 
that may influence the extent of personal vote-seeking. During campaigns, high-
ranking party leaders establish party unity by demonstrating that all the leading officials 
stand on the same platform. Therefore, it is likely that leaders will focus on party 
campaigning, maybe with the exception of the candidate for prime minister.48 
additionally, personalisation might reflect the candidates’ intentions to artificially 
distance themselves from their parties by focusing more on their own candidacy 
during their campaign. The greater the distance candidates perceive between them 
and their parties, the more personalised campaigns are to be expected.49
One of the most important factors in the theoretical sense to influence person-
alisation is candidate selection.50 It has already been demonstrated that selection by 
the national party leaders significantly decreases candidate-orientation in Hungary.51 
Centralised and exclusive selection strengthens the position of the party against 
individual candidates, making them less likely to personalise by their own initiative. 
In our analysis, we control for whether respondents think they were selected by the 
national party leadership. Moving on, as was pointed out earlier, candidates consider 
multiple candidacy as a “safety net.” Those who are nominated also on lists will most 
likely not engage in the costly act of personalisation, because the SMD tier is not the 
only way for them to get elected. Last, but not least, we control for the electoral 
security of candidates, which we measure as the difference between the candidate’s 
or party list’s vote share and the effective electoral threshold.52 Negative values 
indicate that the candidate does not reach the effective threshold, positive values 
suggest the opposite. Values around zero mark candidates who compete in marginal 
districts. We anticipate that candidates in marginal districts organise more 
personalised campaigns compared to both very weak and very strong candidates. To 
test that the connection between electoral security and personalisation is not linear, 
we introduce a squared form of security into the model.
Results
Survey Results
Working with an unbalanced panel, to be able to capture the effect of time, the 
random effects (Re) model appears to be the most appropriate choice.53 The Sargan-
Hansen54 test comparing the estimates of the fixed and random effects models 
indicates that—apart from being more efficient (which is always the case)—the Re 
estimator also results in consistent models. Table 2 summarises the results.
Looking at Table 2, we see almost all of the “usual suspects” affecting campaign 
personalisation in the expected way. Not surprisingly, SMD candidacy has the 
strongest effect on personalisation, which adds an additional proof to the claim55 
that single-member districts invite personal vote-seeking, whereas candidates in 
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multi-member districts lead more party-centred campaigns in Hungary. SMD 
candidacy moves respondents 2.63 points toward the candidate-centred end of the 
scale. Candidate selection does also have a significant effect on personalisation: 
candidates who think that the national party leadership decided on their candidacy 
will pursue more party-centred campaigns (by 0.44 units).
as to the effect of the party, we find that MSZP candidates were substantially 
more candidate-centred than Fidesz candidates. This is hardly a surprise given the 
unpopularity of the party label during the two elections. even given that the changes 
in the electoral rules made the victory of Fidesz more predictable, thus lessening the 
incentives to engage in the costly business of personalised campaigning, strategists 
Table 2
Random effects Generalised Least Squares model explaining campaign 
personalisation
Variables B (Se)
election: 2014 –0.43 (0.22)*
Selection by party leadership –0.44 (0.21)**
SMD candidate 2.63 (0.61)***
SMD incumbent 0.35 (0.31)
Local political position 0.44 (0.24)*
National party official –0.62 (0.36)*
Ideological distance 0.03 (0.09)
MSZPa 1.46 (0.60)**
Jobbika –0.47 (0.53)
LMPa –1.38 (0.69)**
Összefogása –0.21 (0.59)
Candidacy on multiple tiers –0.75 (0.41)*
electoral security 1.03 (1.51)
electoral security^2 –7.02 (1.89)***
Intercept 3.51 (0.74)***
n 604
Wald χ2 387.76
Sigma_u 0.84
Sigma_e 2.09
Rho 0.14
Within R2 0.33
Between R2 0.35
Overall R2 0.34
Note: entries are generalised least squares random effects estimates. Standard errors (Ses) are robust and 
clustered by individual candidates. SMD = single-member districts. Dependent variable: 0 = party-
centred campaign, 10 = candidate-centred campaign.
a.Control group: Fidesz-KDNP.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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of MSZP opted for more personalisation than Fidesz. Nevertheless, the overall level 
of personalisation amongst the ranks of MSZP candidates decreased from 2010 to 
201456 showing how given circumstances made personalisation less appealing in 
general.
Results also confirm the expectation regarding the non-linear relationship between 
electoral security and personalisation. Figure 2 visualises how the level of personali-
sation increases as candidates face fiercer competition (the value of electoral security 
close to 0). Moving from marginal seats (zero) towards secure seats (positive values) 
and lost causes (negative values) the appeal of personalisation decreases. The 
expected value of campaign norms at its highest is 4.42, while it decreases to 3 at the 
two extreme values of electoral security.
although the effects can only be translated to the sample, SMD incumbents 
organise more personalised campaigns regardless of whether they are renominated in 
their SMDs or not. Results also confirm the expected effect of local office holding. 
Local politicians focus on themselves as candidates to a greater extent than 
candidates not embedded into local politics.
as for the effect of time, the results do not support our hypothesis. From 2010 to 
2014, the value of the dependent variable shifted to the party-centred end by 0.43 
points. With all other variable values set to support candidate-centeredness,57 
candidates take 7.6 in 2014 as opposed to 8 units in 2010. Despite institutional 
Figure 2
The marginal effect of electoral security on campaign personalisation
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changes that should have pushed candidates toward more personalisation, Hungarian 
candidates chose to move their campaigns in the opposite direction. given that the 
electoral system (i.e., electoral tier) is the strongest determinant of personal vote-
seeking (pointing to the fact that candidates are sensitive to institutional incentives; 
see Table 2), we must look beyond the survey data to establish what it was that over-
wrote the supposedly strong positive effect of the electoral system change and why. 
In the next section, we seek to answer this question.58
Interviews
The interviews were carried out with nine subjects during January and February 
2015. They lasted an average of approximately 40 minutes, and covered two main 
topics. The first part of the interview sought to identify the main aspects of the SMD 
candidates’ campaign strategies. The participants were asked about how much 
freedom individual candidates had in their campaigns, and to what extent were the 
candidate selection process and the campaign centralised. In the second part, we 
focused on the changes between the two elections: how did the parties’ relations to 
personalisation change from the previous election in 2010 to the most recent in 
2014. Based on the interviews, we identified three broader topics that are not 
connected to the electoral system, and that might have negatively influenced the 
level of personalisation.
Firstly, the interviews confirmed that campaign strategies were controlled by the 
main party figures in all parties. In some cases, the party centre assessed the 
candidates’ campaign strategies individually and made a decision based on feasibility 
and compatibility with the central party strategy. even when the party was less strict 
about individual campaigns, the majority of the candidates sought the assistance of 
the party centre. especially, candidates of small parties transferred the financial 
resources provided by the state59 to the party and received campaign support in the 
form of flyers and call centre technologies in return. Interviewees listed lack of time, 
confidence in the party leaders and cost-effectiveness as main reasons behind this. 
additionally, due to economies of scale considerations, parties that struggled with a 
lack of resources chose to focus on the central campaign instead of promoting 
individual candidates.
Secondly, the change in the number of electoral rounds from two to one led potential 
coalition partners into unknown territory in 2014. Prior to that, parties did not have 
to bargain before the elections: every party nominated its own candidate in the 
SMDs, and electoral results in the first round decided which party withdrew its 
candidate in favour of the other. Parties just tried to sweat the first round out to see 
whether they had any chance to win the district alone. Consequently, the first round 
was about the parties, the second about coalitions. Under the new electoral rules, 
commitments had to be made prior to the elections, which also affects candidate 
selection procedures. Furthermore, other changes in the electoral rules such as 
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redistricting did not favour small parties; in fact, they forced them to enter into a 
coalition with other parties prior to the election. The prolonged negotiations60 on the 
fragmented left strongly affected their candidates’ opportunities to pursue person-
oriented campaigns. Összefogás submitted its candidate list at the beginning of 
February 2014, whereas March 3 was the official deadline for nominations. Thus, 
candidates simply did not have enough time to develop personalised campaigns. By 
contrast, other parties like Fidesz and Jobbik finalised their candidate lists at least six 
months before the elections. Coalition pressure caused additional complications too. 
Over the course of the negotiations, the focus shifted from the selection of candidates 
to certain SMDs to the allocation of constituencies among participating parties. 
Parties had limited control over whether they would get the constituencies where 
they had locally strong candidates. as a result, in many constituencies parties had to 
nominate candidates who had neither previous experience nor visibility on the local 
level. With such a low level of personal vote earning attributes, instead of investing 
into organising personalised campaigns at short notice, parties leant on the central 
party campaign in the SMDs.
Thirdly, interviews highlighted that candidate qualities have also a major impact 
on personalisation in Hungary. electoral experience, incumbency, and local political 
background were mentioned as the most important personal vote earning attributes. 
With regards to electoral experience, in certain parties (DK and Jobbik), candidates 
who had substantial experience in localised campaigning enjoyed a large amount of 
freedom to personalise. Conversely, all parties gave less independence for candidates 
with relatively little experience to take initiative. Parties chose to balance their 
candidates’ limited experience by favouring party campaigning and candidate 
campaigns were exclusively controlled by the party centre. It seems to be fair to 
conclude that limited experience leads to party-centred campaigning, while substantial 
experience results in more personalised campaigns.
additionally, speaking about candidate qualities, interviewees confirmed that in 
general, incumbency has a positive effect on personalisation, and SMD incumbents 
and their challengers usually follow different strategies in their campaigns. They also 
agreed that the campaigns of incumbent candidates should and do focus more on 
local peculiarities, and on candidate attributes that might earn personal vote. 
However, interviews also revealed that Fidesz was quite modest in exploiting the 
campaign value of its incumbents. as the majority of SMD incumbents were 
candidates of Fidesz, the effect of incumbency is negligible in our models (see Table 2).
Last but not least, it was implied that candidates who held local political offices at 
the time of the elections had deviated from the party line and focused more on their 
own campaigns than candidates not involved in local politics. given the fact that 
multiple office-holding was prohibited in 2011, the importance of this finding should 
not be underestimated. This is especially so as in 2014 many of the local office holders 
who utilised more personalised campaigns decided to run as candidates at the local 
elections instead of pursuing national-level legislative careers. Moreover, former 
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MPs and candidates who have held political positions, and for whom it was obvious 
that the local level is more important than national politics, were nominated on party 
lists and not in SMDs. Therefore, in 2014, candidates with local positions had weaker 
links to the local level than their counterparts in 2010. Losing many candidates with 
the willingness and ability to personalise strengthens party-centeredness.
To some extent, the interviews answered the question why Hungarian parliamentary 
candidates pursue more party-centred campaigns when the rules of the game would 
support a shift towards candidate-centeredness. Nevertheless, interviewees agreed 
that without the above political and situational constraints, the changes in the electoral 
rules would affect the parties’ campaign strategies and the candidates’ opportunities 
to pursue personalised campaigns as theorised by the literature. Our subjects admitted 
that with no changes in the political context, parties would have relied more on 
candidate image. However, the changing context proved to be a stronger predictor of 
personalisation than the increasing importance of the SMD tier in getting elected, to 
which parties adapted by de-emphasising candidates.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to capture how recent changes of Hungary’s electoral 
system altered the candidates’ personal vote-seeking strategies. Previous studies of 
the connection between electoral rules and campaign personalisation assume that 
candidate-centred electoral rules encourage personalisation, while party-centeredness 
leads candidates to focus on the party. given the increasing importance of the SMD 
tier in Hungary’s mixed-member electoral system, we might have expected that 
changes in electoral rules would have a positive effect on campaign personalisation. 
First, we utilised the data from two consecutive waves of the Comparative 
Candidates Survey, and modelled campaign personalisation using basic political and 
electoral variables. To grasp the effect of changes between 2010 and 2014, we also 
controlled for time. Second, to interpret the coefficient of the time variable, and to 
determine to what extent the change in the electoral rules played a role in the change 
in personalisation, we carried out interviews with campaign staff members.
The empirical evidence does not entirely meet the expectation based on the literature. 
On the one hand, electoral system characteristics, especially the level of candidacy, 
explain a great deal of campaign personalisation. On the other hand, the overall level of 
personalisation declined between the two elections. even SMD candidates pursued less 
candidate-oriented campaigns in 2014 than in 2010. The interviews revealed that 
candidates and parties followed party-centred strategies as a result of several party 
endogenous political factors. First, because of the shortage of resources and cost-
effectiveness, all parties adopted more centralised campaign organisational strategies. 
Second, the fragmented left struggled with negotiating a compromise in terms of 
candidate selection, which left limited time to build up personalised strategies.
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Third, the interviews also highlighted the importance of candidate quality in per-
sonalisation. Parties that had enough candidates with proper local or campaign expe-
rience left candidates a larger amount of freedom to personalise (DK and Jobbik), 
compared to parties that could not lean on candidate experience. Furthermore, on 
account of the ban on multiple office-holding, local politicians who competed in 
SMDs were prepared to resign from their local level offices. Former MPs and candi-
dates who filled local positions, and perceived defending their local offices as their 
ultimate goals, were not nominated in SMDs, only on the party lists. Consequently, 
in 2014, competing local office holders had a weaker connection to the local level 
than their counterparts in 2010.
The article demonstrates that despite the majoritarian shift in the electoral system, 
the level of personalisation decreased in Hungary. Situational political constrains and 
internal factors like candidate quality prohibit parties from exploiting personalised 
campaigning. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the true effect of the electoral 
system change is still to be revealed: candidates and parties have just begun the 
learning process and how they eventually adapt to the new rules is a question for 
future research. also, future research will reveal if institutional effects are strong 
enough to dominate political context effects on the long run.
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of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, ed. T. Poguntke and P. Webb [Oxford: Oxford 
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56. The average value of the dependent variable significantly (F = 7.3) decreased from 6.1 to 4.5 in 
the case of the MSZP candidate.
57. SMD candidate, holds local political office, backbench, SMD incumbent, average ideological 
distance and electoral security, MSZP candidate, decentralised candidate selection, and single-tier candi-
date.
58. We tested the robustness of our results by running the regression of Table 2 on a matched data set. 
Matching techniques aim at creating one of the key benefits of randomized experiments for estimating 
causal effects, namely, that both the treatment and the control “guaranteed to be only randomly different 
from one another on all background covariates” (e. a. Stuart, “Matching Methods for Causal Inference: 
a Review and a Look Forward,” Statistical Science 25, no. 1 [2010]: 1–21, 1). This seems needed, as the 
electoral reform may have affected the candidate pool itself, especially as it prohibits multiple office 
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Pre-treatment variables were SMD candidacy, party leadership, SMD incumbency, ideological distance 
from the party, party affiliation, the candidate selection method, and electoral security. The new model 
returns a coefficient of −0.54 (Se = 0.25) significant at the 5 per cent level. We decided to keep the 
original random effects generalised least squares model, because the results obtained after running the 
model after the CeM procedure are heavily dependent upon which variables we use as pretreatment fac-
tors. additionally, importance weighting does not work with models applying cluster robust standard 
errors, which we think are essential because of the panel nature of the data. Furthermore, crucial variables, 
such as party affiliation, cannot be controlled for because of the party coalitions at the 2014 election (there 
is no match for the coalition in the 2010 data set). The effect of election is negative in all models (original 
and matched), which speaks against our hypothesis based on the effects of electoral rules.
59. Individual candidates of parties that were able to nominate at least twenty-seven SMD candidates 
received 1 million HUF to cover campaign expenses. Candidates might choose to give the subsidy to their 
parties.
60. after several months of talks, the left-wing opposition parties reached an agreement in 14 January 
2014 to run as a grand alliance for the 2014 parliamentary elections. Two parties (MSZP and együtt 2014) 
began negotiations and the other three parties joined in only later. The negotiations were excessively long, 
because firstly, the initial two parties had difficulties agreeing which other parties should be involved in 
the alliance, and secondly, they had very distinct preferences in regard to campaign policies.
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